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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                            
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
         This case involves a sexual harassment claim by 
plaintiff Margaret Gares against her former employer Willingboro 
Township and the Township's former police chief Gary Owens.  
Following a trial in June of 1993, the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of Gares against the Township for $20,000 in compensatory 
damages and $30,000 in punitive damages pursuant to the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J. Stat. Ann. 
 10:5-1 to -42, and against Owens for $4,000 in compensatory 
damages and $8,000 in punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
 1983.  Owens did not appeal the judgment.  The Township is 
appealing only the jury's award of punitive damages, arguing that 
the district court erroneously denied the Township's motion for 
judgment as a matter of law because: (1) punitive damages are 
unavailable under the LAD against municipalities, (2) New Jersey 
law requires evidence of the defendant's ability to pay as a 
predicate for an award of punitive damages and the plaintiff 
failed to provide such evidence, and (3) there is insufficient 
evidence to support a punitive damage award.  We will affirm. 
 
                                I. 
         In reviewing the denial of the defendants' motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, we must view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.  Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 
F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992). 
         Willingboro Township, a New Jersey municipal 
corporation, is governed by a popularly-elected Town Council, 
which in turn appoints a Township Manager to handle the day-to- 
day operations of the Township in the manner of a chief executive 
officer.  The Township Manager is ultimately responsible for all 
personnel actions, including hirings, promotions, terminations 
and disciplinary sanctions.  Additionally, under the Township's 
policy on sexual harassment, employees are to direct all sexual 
harassment claims to the Township Manager, who must then decide 
what investigative or remedial steps to take. 
         The next tier of Township officials includes the Chief 
of Police, who is the head of the Township's Police Department.  
The Chief of Police, in turn, directly supervises and manages two 
Captains, one of whom is the Captain of the Services Division.  
These two Captains supervise the various sergeants and 
lieutenants within their respective divisions.  The Police 
Department is an integral unit of the Township government, so 
that all who work in the department are in fact Township 
employees. 
         Margaret Gares began working for the Township's Police 
Department in about 1974 as a school traffic guard in the 
Services Division.  From at least 1983, upon her promotion to 
Lieutenant of School Traffic, Gares was under the direct 
supervision and management of defendant Gary Owens, who served as 
Captain of the Services Division until his promotion to Chief of 
Police in October 1990.  Continually over that seven-year period, 
Owens subjected Gares to a sexually hostile work environment by 
engaging in conduct including: calling Gares sexually offensive 
names, such as "bimbo," "bimbette," "tramp," "mere woman," 
"trollop," "dumb blonde," and "Township slut," in the presence of 
her fellow employees; openly condoning degrading conduct against 
female employees by other male employees under Owens' direct 
supervision; permitting the open display of pornographic material 
in the office; encouraging the public telling of obscene jokes; 
and touching Gares in an unwelcome and degrading manner, 
including at one point taunting her by holding her badge up out 
of her reach and pinning her body against the wall of his office 
with his own body.  Owens persisted in such conduct even after 
Gares expressly and publicly asked him to stop.  Each of the 
seven other female employees under Owens' direct supervision in 
the Services Division had made complaints similar to Gares' to 
then Chief of Police Richard Van Sciver. 
         A few specific examples of Owens' conduct will provide 
ample illustration of the nature of his actions.  At one point, 
while Owens was Captain of Gares' division, someone left an 
obscene photograph on Gares' desk of a nude, extremely large- 
breasted woman, with Gares' name written across the top of the 
photograph.  When Gares arrived at her desk and discovered the 
photograph, Owens and several other male officers laughed, much 
to Gares' anger and embarrassment, and Owens compared Gares' 
breasts to those depicted in the photograph.  A female co-worker 
testified that Owens had made rude remarks about Gares' breasts 
on a number of occasions, calling them "bazooka-size" or 
"elephant-size." 
         In 1988, on the day after a Township-sponsored seminar 
on sexual harassment in the workplace (a mandatory seminar that 
Gares, but not Owens, attended), Gares was working at her desk, 
which was situated with other desks in a large, main office.  A 
broken garage door into the building was making a lot of noise, 
and one of a group of several male officers (including Captain 
Owens) asked what the source of the noise was.  Another male 
officer replied, "Oh, just ignore it, that's [Gares'] dildo."  
Angry and embarrassed by the officers' and Owens' laughter, Gares 
immediately stated, as she had been instructed to do in the 
previous day's seminar, that Owens and the officers were all "on 
notice" that she found that conduct offensive and wanted it to 
stop.  She then asked Owens, as the officers' supervisor, 
formally to reprimand the officer who had made the offensive 
joke.  Owens merely walked away, laughing, to his office, but 
Gares followed him and repeated her demand.  Owens then sharply 
replied, "Just get out of my office, I don't have time for you."  
(Supp. App. at 8.) 
         Thus, by his own affirmative conduct, and by tolerating 
and encouraging similarly offensive conduct on the part of other 
male employees against Gares and her female co-workers, Captain 
Owens created and fostered a sexually hostile work environment in 
the Services Division. 
         The Police Department operated on a strict "chain-of- 
command" procedure for employees to register their work-related 
complaints.  Under this system, an employee with a complaint of 
sexual harassment must first complain to her immediate 
supervisor.  If she is not satisfied with her immediate 
supervisor's response, the employee must persuade that supervisor 
to permit an appeal to the next official in the Department's 
command hierarchy.  Should the complaining employee's supervisor 
choose not to authorize an appeal, the matter would be at an end: 
a Police Department employee was not permitted to bypass her 
immediate supervisor to report complaints directly to the Chief 
of Police or to the Township Manager.  Former Chief Van Sciver 
testified that, if the Chief of Police elects not to tell the 
Township Manager, the Township Manager would never learn of the 
complaint.  Several witnesses testified that the Police 
Department had clear, standing orders, reaffirmed periodically, 
that employees were to obey the chain-of-command rules and were 
not to see the Township Manager without the permission of the 
Chief of Police. 
         The Police Department's chain-of-command policy 
conflicted squarely with the Township's sexual harassment policy 
which provides that all employees should direct complaints of 
sexual harassment to the Township Manager.  Gares and several 
other long-term Police Department employees testified, however, 
that they were unaware of the Township's sexual harassment 
policy.  Chief Van Sciver was aware of the Township policy and of 
the Township Manager's personal "open door" policy, but he 
nonetheless enforced his department's chain-of-command policy 
because he believed it encouraged employees to work out their 
problems among themselves. 
         Gares' immediate supervisor was Owens, the man who was 
sexually harassing her, and so the Department's chain-of-command 
procedure trapped her between the Scylla of enduring Owens' 
offensive conduct and the Charybdis of possible termination for 
violating the chain-of-command rules by reporting Owens' conduct 
directly to the Chief of Police or the Township Manager.  Gares 
endured Owens' conduct towards her and his dismissive responses 
to her complaints for years. 
         On one occasion in 1987, however, when former Chief Van 
Sciver happened to observe Gares in tears after Owens had made a 
sexually offensive remark to her, Van Sciver asked Gares what was 
the matter.  Gares complained of Owens' conduct and explained 
that Owens had denied her permission to appeal to the Township 
Manager.  Van Sciver told Gares he would take care of the matter, 
but Owens persisted in his offensive conduct.  About a year 
later, Van Sciver again happened to observe Gares in tears 
following another of Owens' remarks, and Gares explained that 
Owens' offensive conduct had not diminished.  Van Sciver told 
Gares that both he and the Township Manager were aware of the 
situation.  Van Sciver engaged Gares in a third such conversation 
in 1989, repeating his assurances, yet neither Van Sciver nor the 
Township Manager ever conducted any investigation or took any 
remedial action. 
         After Owens had been promoted to Chief of Police, and 
shortly after Gares filed her discrimination charges with state 
and federal agencies in the spring of 1991, Gares met with the 
Township Manager to discuss Gares' allegations against Owens.  
The Township Manager told Gares that she did not believe Owens 
would do such things, and asked if Gares thought Owens "had a 
thing" for her.  (Supp. App. at 60.)  Following this meeting, the 
Township Manager took no steps to investigate the allegations or 
to correct the situation. 
         In September 1991, Gares filed this civil rights action 
in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey, alleging violations of  1983 and the LAD.  In June 
1993, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Gares against the 
Township for $20,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in 
punitive damages pursuant to the LAD, and against Owens for 
$4,000 in compensatory damages and $8,000 in punitive damages 
pursuant to  1983.  Following the entry of judgment, Gares 
timely moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the LAD 
and  1988, and the Township moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50(b) for judgment as a matter of law as to both the compensatory 
and punitive damages verdicts.  After denying the motion for 
judgment as a matter of law and granting the award of attorney's 
fees, the district court entered final judgment.  This timely 
appeal followed. 
 
                               II. 
         The district court had jurisdiction over the  1983 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1331 and 1343, and the court had 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law discrimination 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1367.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291. 
 
                               III. 
                                A. 
         The Township argues first that punitive damages are 
generally unavailable against municipal corporations and that a 
court should not construe a statute to allow such damages absent 
clear legislative expression or intent.  Gares counters that the 
LAD does, by its express terms, its legislative history and the 
relevant case law, clearly provide for punitive damages against 
all employers, including municipalities.   
         In adjudicating a case under state law, we are not free 
to impose our own view of what state law should be; rather, we 
are to apply state law as interpreted by the state's highest 
court in an effort to predict how that court would decide the 
precise legal issues before us.  Kowalsky v. Long Beach Twp., 72 
F.3d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1995); McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 32 
F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1994).  In the absence of guidance from 
the state's highest court, we are to consider decisions of the 
state's intermediate appellate courts for assistance in 
predicting how the state's highest court would rule.  McKenna, 32 
F.3d at 825; Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 664 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (in predicting state law, we cannot disregard the 
decision of an intermediate appellate court unless we are 
convinced that the state's highest court would decide otherwise).  
Our review of the district court's determination of state law is 
de novo.  Kowalsky, 72 F.3d at 388. 
         Although the New Jersey Supreme Court and a panel of 
the superior court have, as explained below, spoken to the issue 
at hand, their decisions are not controlling law: the supreme 
court decision was evenly split 3-3, and, in New Jersey, a panel 
of the Superior Court, Appellate Division, is not bound by a 
prior decision of another panel of that court.  E.g., Manturi v. 
V.J.V., Inc., 431 A.2d 859, 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) 
("A decision of an inferior court is not binding on a court of 
coordinate jurisdiction.").  These decisions nevertheless remain 
important guides for, in determining how the New Jersey courts 
would approach and solve our problem, we must consider "analogous 
decisions, considered dicta, . . . and any other reliable data 
tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state 
would decide the issue at hand."  McGowan v. University of 
Scranton, 759 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
         We begin with the plain language of the statute.  Under 
the LAD, it is unlawful for an "employer" to discriminate against 
an employee on the basis of her sex.  N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5-13.  
The statute expressly defines the term "employer" to include "the 
State, any political or civil subdivision thereof, and all public 
officers, agencies, boards or bodies."  N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5- 
5(e).  The LAD was amended in 1990 specifically to clarify that 
it makes available jury trials and legal remedies, including 
punitive damages: 
         The Legislature further finds that because of 
         discrimination, people suffer personal 
         hardships, and the State suffers a grievous 
         harm. . . .  Such harms have, under the 
         common law, given rise to legal remedies, 
         including compensatory and punitive damages.  
         The Legislature intends that such damages be 
         available to all persons protected by this 
         act and that this act shall be liberally 
         construed in combination with other 
         protections available under the laws of this 
         State. 
N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5-3 (emphasis added).  The statute 
reiterates: "All remedies available in common law tort actions 
shall be available to prevailing plaintiffs.  These remedies are 
in addition to any provided by this act or any other statute."  
N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5-13. 
         As Gares points out, the plain language of the statute 
indicates the legislature's intent to make punitive damages 
available under the LAD to all plaintiffs, including those with 
public employers.  Gares also refers us to the legislative 
history of the 1990 amendments, which were enacted to overrule a 
1989 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court by expressly 
providing that jury trials and punitive damages are available 
under both the LAD and the Conscientious Employee Protection Act 
("CEPA"), N.J. Stat. Ann.  34:19-1 to -8 (also known as the 
"Whistleblower Act").  That legislative history states that "the 
LAD is to be liberally construed so that all common law remedies, 
including compensatory and punitive damages, are available to 
persons protected by the LAD."  Assembly Judiciary, Law and 
Public Safety Committee, Statement to Assembly Committee 
Substitute for Assembly Nos. 2872, 2118 and 2228 (Feb. 8, 1990), 
reprinted in N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5-3 at 454 (West 1993) and in1990 N.J. 
Sess. Law Serv. 70, 73 (West).  Thus, the legislative 
history reinforces the plain, broad and inclusive language of the 
statute and nowhere indicates any intention to exempt public 
entities from possible punitive damages awards. 
         A review of New Jersey case law provides no reason to 
imply an exception for public employers into the LAD's express 
punitive damage provisions, but instead reinforces the plain 
meaning of the statute.  In Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of 
Educ., 650 A.2d 958 (N.J. 1994), the New Jersey Supreme Court, in 
a 3-3 decision on the issue, let stand a superior court holding 
that punitive damages are available against public entities under 
CEPA--a statute the state supreme court has noted is analogous in 
relevant language, purpose, and legislative history to the LAD.  
See Abbamont, 650 A.2d at 971; N.J. Stat. Ann.  34:19-5 (West 
Supp. 1995) (CEPA language, analogous to LAD language, providing: 
"All remedies available in common law tort actions shall be 
available to prevailing plaintiffs.  These remedies are in 
addition to any legal or equitable relief provided by this act or 
any other statute.  The court may also order . . . [p]unitive 
damages . . . .").  Although the decisions of the supreme court 
plurality and the superior court in Abbamont are not controlling 
state law, we believe the majority and dissenting opinions in 
that case best demonstrate how the New Jersey courts would 
approach the issue before us and, accordingly, those opinions 
provide the best guidance in predicting how the supreme court 
would decide our issue today. 
         The plaintiff in Abbamont was a non-tenured industrial 
arts teacher who sued the board of education under CEPA, alleging 
that he was not rehired in retaliation for his complaints about 
inadequate ventilation in his shop.  The jury returned a verdict 
for the teacher, but the trial court withheld the punitive 
damages issue from the jury.  The superior court on appeal 
reversed and remanded for a jury trial on the issue of punitive 
damages, holding that punitive damages are available under CEPA 
against public entities.  Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of 
Educ., 634 A.2d 538, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 
650 A.2d 958 (N.J. 1994).  An evenly-divided New Jersey Supreme 
Court affirmed. 
         The plurality's analysis in Abbamont began with 
observations analogous to those above about the plain language of 
the statute.  Like the LAD, CEPA proscribes certain conduct by 
employers (specifically, retaliatory action against employees for 
disclosing the employer's unlawful practices or policies), and 
the statute defines "employer" to include, inter alia, "all 
branches of State Government, or the several counties and 
municipalities thereof . . . ."  N.J. Stat. Ann.  34:19-2(a).  
CEPA explicitly provides that an aggrieved employee may seek 
relief including punitive damages.  N.J. Stat. Ann.  34:19-5(f).  
The Abbamont plurality, like the superior court majority, found 
this plain language of the statute compelling, and observed that 
"no specific CEPA provision exists that precludes the awarding of 
punitive damages against public employers.  That omission must be 
deemed purposeful."  650 A.2d at 968. 
         The Abbamont dissenters, while conceding that CEPA can 
be broadly read to permit a punitive damages award against a 
public employer, observed that CEPA does not explicitly state 
that punitive damages may be awarded against public employers.  
The dissent then expressed doubt that, by enacting CEPA, the 
state legislature intended to "overcom[e]" New Jersey's Tort 
Claims Act ("TCA") insofar as the TCA provides that "[n]o 
punitive or exemplary damages shall be awarded against a public 
entity."  N.J. Stat. Ann.  59:9-2c.  "The problem," the dissent 
stated, "is in reconciling the language of [the TCA] with that 
[of CEPA]."  650 A.2d at 973 (Pollock, J., dissenting in part).  
The dissent, also mentioning several public policy reasons why 
such punitive damages awards should not be available, concluded 
that "not permitting punitive-damage awards against public 
employers is more consistent with the legislative intent," and 
that "[t]he best solution would be for the Legislature to revisit 
the issue and resolve it definitively."  Id. 
         The principal issue that divided the supreme court in 
Abbamont, then, was whether the LAD could be reconciled with the 
TCA.  The plurality rejected the "implied repealer" argument 
because "[t]he presumption against an implied repealer is 
grounded in the basic statutory construction rule 'that every 
effort should be made to harmonize the law relating to the same 
subject matter'" and the "TCA and CEPA involve different subject 
matter."  Abbamont, 650 A.2d at 970 (quoting State v. Green, 303 
A.2d 312 (N.J. 1973)) (emphasis in original).  In discussing this 
point, the plurality drew from precedent regarding the LAD, 
relying on the strong parallels between CEPA and the LAD.  Citing 
Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652 (N.J.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
826 (1988), the Abbamont plurality noted that the LAD's purpose 
is to abolish discrimination in the workplace, a goal that serves 
both public and private interests, whereas the TCA's purpose is 
to provide compensation to tort victims without imposing 
excessive financial burdens on the taxpaying public.  Abbamont, 
650 A.2d at 970.  The LAD provides relief from conduct more akin 
to the malicious or willful acts exempted from the TCA than the 
negligently inflicted injuries covered thereby.  "Moreover, '[the 
Tort Claims] Act disavows any remedial purpose to vindicate 
societal interests or to rectify public or governmental 
misconduct or to protect any individual constitutional or civil 
right.  It thus expressly prohibits exemplary or punitive damages 
under the Act.'"  Abbamont, 650 A.2d at 970 (quoting Fuchilla, 
537 A.2d at 665 (Handler, J., concurring)) (alteration in 
original).  The LAD, by contrast, is a civil rights statute that 
embraces the remedial purpose disavowed by the TCA, and as such 
"should be construed liberally to effectuate its important social 
goal."  Id. at 971; see also N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5-3 ("The 
Legislature intends that . . . this act shall be liberally 
construed . . . ."). 
         The Abbamont plurality also recognized that punitive 
damages are available under the LAD only where the offending 
conduct "is particularly egregious," 650 A.2d at 970, which the 
supreme court has defined, as explained more fully below, as 
conduct that is intentional, malicious, and "evil-minded."  
Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1215 (N.J. 1995).  The TCA, in 
contrast, explicitly provides that a public entity is not liable 
thereunder "for the acts or omissions of a public employee 
constituting . . . actual malice[] or willful misconduct."  N.J. 
Stat. Ann.  59:2-10.  Thus, the TCA does not apply to 
intentional wrongs such as give rise to claims under the LAD, so 
that the TCA's "limitation[] on judgments" proscribing punitive 
damages awards for tort claims brought thereunder, id.  59:9- 
2(c), is simply inapplicable to the LAD.  The two statutes 
operate independently of one another.  As the New Jersey Supreme 
Court concluded in Fuchilla, because of the differences in 
purpose and scope of the two statutes, "the Legislature did not 
intend that the [Tort Claims] Act apply to discrimination claims 
under the [LAD]."  537 A.2d at 660. 
         We accordingly predict that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would follow its decision in Fuchilla and the plurality 
opinion in Abbamont to hold that the TCA's exclusion of punitive 
damages awards against public entities is not controlling in 
light of the LAD's plain language and stated purpose.  Because 
the supreme court has held that the TCA does not apply to claims 
under the LAD alleging intentional or malicious misconduct of a 
public employee, there is no conflict between the two statutes, 
and accordingly no implied repealer under New Jersey law. 
         Not only did the supreme court plurality in Abbamontfind the TCA 
no barrier to punitive damage recoveries against 
municipalities in CEPA actions, it also found that the TCA 
"exemplifies the Legislature's ability to exclude the 
availability of punitive damages against public entities when it 
so chooses.  See also N.J.S.A. 59:13-3 (providing 'no recovery 
against the State for punitive . . . damages arising out of 
contract' allowed under the Contractual Liability Act)."  650 
A.2d at 969 (omission in original).  But the state legislature 
did not exclude such recovery under either the LAD or CEPA, and 
the plurality was unwilling to attribute this result to 
legislative inadvertence or oversight: "That omission must be 
deemed purposeful," for the TCA "reestablished sovereign immunity 
against tort claims 'except whe[n] there is a statutory 
declaration of liability.'"  Id. (quoting Burke v. Deiner, 479 
A.2d 393, 397 (N.J. 1984)). 
         Finally, the plurality, like the superior court 
majority, found that the New Jersey legislature must have 
considered and rejected policy arguments such as those 
articulated a decade earlier in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 
Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (holding that punitive damages are not 
available against municipalities under 42 U.S.C.  1983), when it 
amended the LAD and CEPA in 1990 to make punitive damages 
available to "all persons" protected under the two statutes. 
Abbamont, 650 A.2d at 969-70; 634 A.2d at 547.  The Abbamontplurality also 
stated that those policy concerns are partly 
alleviated by the heightened standard for imposing liability for 
punitive damages under the LAD as articulated in Lehmann v. Toys 
'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 464 (N.J. 1993) (expressly rejecting 
a theory of vicarious liability and holding that punitive damages 
are available under the LAD only if the conduct of managerial or 
supervisory officials is particularly egregious and involves 
willful indifference or actual participation).  "Based on that 
kind of misuse of governmental authority," the Abbamont plurality 
observed, "punitive damages serve to effectuate the goals of a 
statute that is specifically designed to discourage and eradicate 
vindictive action by employers and to further important interests 
of both employees and the public."  650 A.2d at 970; see alsoLehmann, 626 
A.2d at 465 ("We think that providing employers with 
the incentive not only to provide voluntary compliance programs 
but also to insist on the effective enforcement of their programs 
will do much to ensure that hostile work environment 
discrimination claims disappear from the workplace and the 
courts.").  The Abbamont plurality thus "defer[red] to the 
Legislature in including punitive damages in the remedial arsenal 
available against public as well as private employers for 
especially virulent retaliatory conduct."  650 A.2d at 970. 
         We find the analysis of the Abbamont plurality 
persuasive.  We agree with its ultimate conclusion:  "A sensible 
and unconstrained reading of the language of CEPA, a 
consideration of the provisions of CEPA in light of the Tort 
Claims Act (TCA), a review of CEPA's legislative history, an 
understanding of the underlying policy concerns in awarding 
punitive damages against public entities, and an examination of 
CEPA's remedial purpose persuade us that CEPA does allow the 
award of punitive damages against public entities."  Id. at 968 
(citation omitted). 
         Moreover, we conclude that the analysis of the Abbamontplurality 
regarding the CEPA is equally persuasive in the context 
of the LAD.  The LAD and CEPA are quite similar in their broad 
language, remedial purpose, and legislative history (having both 
been amended by the same act to include jury trials and punitive 
damages).  The New Jersey Supreme Court treated them as matching 
pairs in Abbamont, construing the LAD and CEPA together as 
distinct from the TCA.  Abbamont could as easily have been a 
decision under the LAD; the same arguments apply equally to both 
statutes. 
         Given the plain language, legislative history and 
purpose of the LAD, and considering the New Jersey courts' 
interpretations of the LAD and CEPA, we predict that the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey would hold that the LAD permits the recovery 
of punitive damages against public entities. 
 
                                B. 
         The Township next argues that the punitive damages 
award must be set aside because the plaintiff produced no 
evidence of the defendant's financial condition or ability to 
pay.  Gares counters that there was sufficient evidence before 
the jury from which it could have inferred that the Township had 
the ability to pay the $30,000 punitive damages award it 
assessed.  She also points to the district court's assertion that 
it would be "an absolute waste of judicial time and resources" to 
conduct a second trial on the punitive damages issue, solely to 
add evidence of the Township's ability to pay, where the 
offending conduct was so egregious and the punitive damages award 
was only $30,000.  (Dist. Ct. Op. of June 16, 1994 at 9.)  As 
explained above, we exercise plenary review over the district 
court's determination of state law. 
         Under the general law of punitive damages in New 
Jersey, the plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence of the 
defendant's ability to pay a punitive damages award.  Herman v. 
Sunshine Chemical Specialties, Inc., 627 A.2d 1081, 1090 (N.J. 
1993) (stating that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a 
defendant's financial condition in "all claims for punitive 
damages"); McDonough v. Jorda, 519 A.2d 874, 879 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1986) (holding that, "[i]n assessing exemplary damages, 
a jury must take into consideration the wealth of the 
defendants"--"an essential of [the plaintiff's] burden of proof," 
the absence of which "precluded the jury from having a proper 
foundation to assess damages"), certif. denied, 540 A.2d 1282 
(N.J. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). 
         In Herman, the New Jersey Supreme Court was called upon 
to interpret a New Jersey Products Liability Act provision 
regarding punitive damages.  Although the statute, in accordance 
with New Jersey common law, expressly provided that the trier of 
fact "shall consider . . . [t]he financial condition of the 
tortfeasor," the statute did not expressly allocate the burden of 
proof on that issue.  627 A.2d at 1087-88 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann 
 2A:58C-5d(4)).  As the supreme court noted, however, the 
statute does explicitly state that "[e]xcept as otherwise 
expressly provided in this act, no provision of this act is 
intended to establish any rule, or alter any existing rule, with 
respect to the burden of proof . . . ."  Id. at 1088 (quoting 
N.J. Stat. Ann.  2A:58C-7).  "Just one year before the adoption 
of the act," noted the court, "the Appellate Division made clear 
that the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff."  Id. (citing 
McDonough, 519 A.2d at 879).  Because the statute did not change 
that allocation, the supreme court concluded that the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof of the defendant's ability to pay under 
the Products Liability Act.  Id. 
         We believe the New Jersey Supreme Court would similarly 
conclude that this rule applies to punitive damages awards under 
the LAD.  The LAD is silent as to the requisite proof or 
instructions regarding punitive damages awards.  As explained 
above, the state legislature amended the LAD in 1990 to provide 
for "legal remedies, including compensatory and punitive 
damages," such as existed at "common law."  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
 10:5-3.  The state legislature thus made available punitive 
damages awards under the LAD with conscious reference to the 
existing common law of punitive damages awards.  See also id. 10:5-13 
("All remedies available in common law tort actions 
shall be available to prevailing plaintiffs.").  At the time the 
LAD was enacted, New Jersey common law provided that the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof of the defendant's financial 
condition to support an award of punitive damages.  See Herman, 
627 A.2d at 1088 (citing 1986 superior court decision in 
McDonough).  We believe the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
accordingly interpret the LAD to hold that the general law of New 
Jersey regarding evidence of a defendant's ability to pay applies 
to LAD actions involving punitive damages. 
         The plaintiff's failure to produce evidence of the 
defendant's ability to pay does not necessarily require the court 
to set aside a jury's award of punitive damages, however.  SeeHerman, 627 
A.2d at 1090 (holding that, although the plaintiff 
failed to produce the requisite evidence of the defendant's 
financial condition, the jury ultimately heard sufficient 
evidence thereof to support the punitive damages award).  The 
supreme court in Herman noted that a defense witness testified on 
cross-examination that, during a year relevant to the litigation, 
the company had had gross sales of $3.5 million and its owner had 
sold 100% of its stock for $750,000.  627 A.2d at 1090.  The 
court found that this circumstantial evidence of ability to pay, 
"although not overwhelming, [was] sufficient to support an award 
of punitive damages" of $400,000 where the defendant did not 
argue that the award was excessive.  Id. 
         New Jersey requires juries to take into account 
evidence of the defendant's financial condition "because the 
theory behind punitive damages is to punish for the past event 
and to prevent future offenses, and the degree of punishment 
resulting from a judgment must be, to some extent, in proportion 
to the means of the guilty person."  McDonough, 519 A.2d at 879 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts  908 cmt. d (1977)); 
accord Herman, 627 A.2d at 1089 (noting that the purposes of 
punitive damages are punishment and deterrence).  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court noted in Herman that the evidence of "ability to 
pay" does not necessarily equate with "net worth" because, 
"[d]epending on the facts of a case, a defendant's income might 
be a better indicator of the ability to pay."  627 A.2d at 1089. 
         The relevance of such evidence therefore goes solely to 
the amount of an appropriate damage award.  It is relevant to the 
amount of such an award for two reasons.  The amount should be 
large enough in relation to the defendant's ability to pay so 
that the sanction is felt, i.e., is effective.  On the other 
hand, the amount should be small enough in relation to the 
defendant's ability to pay that it is not over-the-hill, i.e., 
beyond the defendant's ability to pay without unduly harsh 
consequences.  See generally Herman, 627 A.2d at 1086-87 
(discussing arguments for and against having juries consider 
evidence of a defendant's wealth). 
         If the record in a case provides some basis for a 
conclusion that the verdict is not beyond the defendant's ability 
to pay, we do not believe a defendant would be heard to complain 
in New Jersey about the possibility of the award being too low.  
We think this is such a case.  While the current record regarding 
the Township's ability to pay might not support a very large 
punitive damage verdict, we believe the jury could, as the 
district court found that it did, infer from background evidence 
bearing circumstantially on the ability to pay issue that the 
Township could fairly be called upon to pay a punitive damage 
award of $30,000.  Trial testimony indicated that the Township 
employed over 100 police officers and traffic guards (plus an 
unspecified number of supervisors, secretaries and support staff) 
in its police department alone, allowing the jury reasonably to 
infer that, if the Township could pay normal wages to hundreds of 
employees, it had the ability to pay $30,000 to one wronged 
employee.  "[A]lthough not overwhelming," this evidence is 
sufficient to support the relatively small punitive damages award 
under the facts of this case.  See Herman, 627 A.2d at 1090.  
Like the defendant in Herman, the Township does not argue that 
the award is excessive.  On this basis, we predict that the 
supreme court would find the award supported on the facts of this 
case.  Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not 
err in refusing to set aside the jury's award of punitive damages 
against the Township. 
 
                                C. 
         Arguing that there is no evidence of exceptional 
circumstances necessary to support a punitive damages award under 
the LAD, the Township's final contention is that the district 
court erred in refusing to set aside the punitive damages award 
against the Township for insufficient evidence.  In resolving 
this issue, we must review the district court's denial of the 
Township's motion for judgment as a matter of law.  We apply the 
same federal standard the district court should have applied: 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
a motion for judgment as a matter of law should be denied unless 
the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantum of 
evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.  
Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992). 
         In the context of CEPA but drawing from precedent under 
the LAD, a plurality of the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated 
that punitive damages are available against public entities 
         if the conduct of managerial or supervisory 
         government officials is particularly 
         egregious and involves willful indifference 
         or actual participation.  Based on that kind 
         of misuse of governmental authority, punitive 
         damages serve to effectuate the goals of a 
         statute that is specifically designed to 
         discourage and eradicate vindictive [or, 
         under the LAD, discriminatory] action by 
         employers and to further important interests 
         of both employees and the public. 
Abbamont, 650 A.2d at 970 (discussing standards articulated in 
Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 464 (N.J. 1993) 
(regarding the LAD)). 
         The supreme court's most recent articulation of the 
standard for awarding punitive damages against an employer under 
the LAD is this: the plaintiff must establish (1) that the 
offending conduct was "especially egregious" and (2) that upper 
management actually participated in or was willfully indifferent 
towards that conduct.  Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1215 
(N.J. 1995) (citing Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 464).   The court stated 
that, for the offending conduct to be "sufficiently egregious to 
warrant a punitive-damage award," the conduct must be "wantonly 
reckless or malicious," or, 
         an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an 
         "evil-minded act" or an act accompanied by a 
         wanton and wilful disregard of the rights of 
         another. . . .  Our cases indicate that the 
         requirement [of willfulness or wantonness] 
         may be satisfied upon a showing that there 
         has been a deliberate act or omission with 
         knowledge of a high degree of probability of 
         harm and reckless indifference to 
         consequences. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).  
The employer in Rendine surreptitiously replaced the plaintiff 
employee while she was on maternity leave and then contrived 
pretextual reasons upon her return to fire her.  The court held 
that the evidence was sufficient to "permit[] the jury to 
conclude that defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff's 
employment was accompanied by conduct that was malicious and 
intentionally wrongful."  Id. at 1216. 
         Applying this standard here, we must first address 
whether there is sufficient evidence from which the jury might 
reasonably have found that Owens' conduct was "especially 
egregious."  We believe that there is ample evidence to support 
such a conclusion.  Owens' actions are the sort of "deliberate 
act[s] or omission[s] with knowledge of a high degree of 
probability of harm and reckless indifference to consequences" 
that warrant a punitive damages award under the LAD.  Id. at 1215 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In short, because there is 
sufficient evidence that Captain Owens fostered a sexually 
hostile work environment within the Services Division, and that 
he persisted for years in his highly offensive conduct despite 
his knowledge that it offended and upset Gares, the jury could 
reasonably have found that Owens' conduct was "especially 
egregious." 
         The second prong of the punitive damages standard 
requires us to consider whether there is sufficient evidence that 
upper management actually participated in or was callously 
indifferent towards the offensive conduct.  We believe the jury 
might reasonably have found that Owens' position qualified him as 
"upper management" himself.  For the first seven years of Owens' 
harassment of Gares (from 1983 to 1990), Owens was the Captain in 
charge of the Services Division wherein plaintiff Gares worked, 
answerable only to the Chief of Police and the Township Manager 
above him.  As Captain of the Services Division, Owens set the 
atmosphere and controlled the day-to-day operations of that 
office.  Because of his high rank and pervasive influence over 
the employees he supervised, the jury was entitled to find that 
Captain Owens was an upper management official whose outrageous 
conduct subjected the Township to punitive damages liability 
under the LAD. 
         Although Owens may be the only supervisory official who 
actually participated in the offensive conduct, the jury's award 
can also be justified because there is evidence that other "upper 
management" officials showed callous disregard for Owens' 
conduct.  The record would support a finding that Chief Van 
Sciver, and perhaps even the Township Manager herself, were aware 
of but willfully indifferent to Gares' complaints.  On several 
occasions between 1987 and 1989 when Gares complained to Chief 
Van Sciver about Owens' offensive conduct, Van Sciver would 
promise to "take care of" the situation and would say he had told 
the Township Manager about Gares' complaints, but neither he nor 
the Township Manager did anything to investigate or remedy the 
situation over the next few years.  The Township agreed with the 
district court that Chief Van Sciver's statement's are 
attributable to the Township itself (Supp. App. at 3-4)--which is 
especially appropriate in light of the Police Department's chain- 
of-command policy that prohibited Gares from appealing directly 
to the Township Manager.  When the Township Manager read Gares' 
administrative complaint, she told Gares she "didn't believe 
Owens would ever say such things" and asked Gares if she thought 
Owens "had a thing" for Gares.  Given the outrageousness of 
Captain Owens' conduct towards the women in his division and 
towards Gares in particular, and given the seven-year period over 
which all this conduct took place on a daily or weekly basis, the 
jury could reasonably have concluded that Chief Van Sciver and 
the Township Manager were aware of but callously and deliberately 
indifferent towards Owens' egregious conduct. 
         Thus, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's award of punitive damages against the 
Township, and that the district court accordingly did not err in 
declining to set that award aside. 
 
                               IV. 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order denying the Township's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law. 
 
GARES v. WILLINGBORO TOWNSHIP, et al. 
No. 95-5269 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
         The immunity at common law of municipal corporations 
from liability for punitive damages was generally understood when 
the federal Civil Rights Act became law in 1871.  Courts that had 
considered the issue prior to the enactment of section 1983 "were 
virtually unanimous in denying such damages against a municipal 
corporation."  City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 
247, 259 (1981).  Judicial aversion against awarding punitive 
damages against a municipality persists in the overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions even now.  "The general rule today is 
that no punitive damages are awarded unless expressly authorized 
by statute."  Id.; 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corps.  53.18.10, 
p.247 (3rd Ed. 1993).   
         The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), 
N.J.S.A.  10:5-1 et seq., does not expressly make a 
municipality liable for punitive damages.  Moreover, strong 
public policy and logic militate against the assessment of such 
exemplary damages.  Because of these reasons, I believe the New 
Jersey Supreme Court would hold that municipalities in the State 
of New Jersey are immune from punitive damages in suits brought 
against them under the LAD.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
                                I. 
         Gares, a Township employee, suffered discrimination and 
harassment because of her sex.  This is a violation of her civil 
rights under federal and New Jersey law, and the jury 
appropriately compensated her for the actual damages she 
suffered.  The jury also found that the offender, former police 
chief Gary Owens, behaved egregiously, and assessed punitive 
damages against him to punish or to teach him a lesson.  But 
that, in my view, is the limit of the damages which plaintiff can 
recover for her injuries. 
         The District Court permitted the jury to assess 
punitive damages against the township of Willingboro as well, 
under New Jersey's LAD.  Because this raises a question 
pertaining to the correct statutory interpretation, it is a 
purely legal issue.  Thus, this court should exercise plenary 
review, giving no deference to the district court's holding.  
Oritani Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of 
Maryland, 989 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1993). 
         The majority relies on a 3-3 decision addressing the 
question of the availability of punitive damages against a 
municipality in New Jersey's Conscientious Employee Protection 
Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A.  34:19-1 et seq., a substantially similar 
statute designed to protect "whistleblowers" from retaliatory 
action by their employers.  In Abbamont v. Piscataway Township 
Board of Education, 634 A.2d 538 (N.J.Super. 1993), the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, in a 2-1 decision, held that the issue of 
punitive damages against the Township for violations of CEPA, 
under a theory of vicarious liability, should be submitted to the 
jury.  The majority reasoned that, because public employers were 
not specifically exempted from this portion of the statute, they 
were impliedly included. 
         The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, split on this 
issue, 3 to 3.  In Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Board of 
Education, 650 A.2d 958 (N.J. 1994), the opinion written by Judge 
Handler adopted the reasoning of the panel majority of the 
Superior Court.  Judge Pollock, however, joined by two other 
judges, held that "the Legislature did not intend that public 
entities should be subject to payment of punitive damages under 
the Conscientious Employee Protection Act."  Abbamont, 650 A.2d 
at 972-73 (Pollock, J., dissenting).  Accordingly we have no 
clear mandate from the New Jersey Supreme Court on this issue.  
Although the majority in this case recognizes that we have no 
controlling law, typescript at 10, it fully adopts the reasoning 
of the Handler opinion.  I believe that this reasoning ignores 
important considerations of history, policy and United States 
Supreme Court precedent which today would decisively influence a 
majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court to the contrary. 
              LAD itself is silent upon this issue.  It 
specifically includes the State and its political subdivisions in 
its definition of employer, N.J.S.A.  10:5-5(e), and provides 
that "[a]ll remedies available in common-law tort actions shall 
be available to prevailing plaintiffs."  N.J.S.A. 10:5-13.  
Based on a tortured reading of these two provisions, Gares 
asserts that the statute provides for the imposition of punitive 
damages against a municipality.  The majority agrees, relying 
heavily on a phrase within the LAD that provides that the Act 
"shall be liberally construed."  N.J.S.A.  10:5-3.  This phrase 
is insufficient to constitute express authorization of punitive 
damages against municipalities in light of history and 
overwhelming case law; express authorization is what is needed to 
make them available to plaintiffs. 
         Municipalities were absolutely immune from suit at 
common law.  The New Jersey legislature may have abrogated this 
immunity for purposes of the LAD, but there is no evidence in the 
plain language of the Act or in the legislative history to show 
that the legislature intended to abrogate immunity so far as to 
make municipalities liable for punitive damages over and above 
compensation to the injured employee.  The majority relies on 
implication to reach this conclusion, an implication which I 
cannot believe the legislature intended. 
         At common law, it was well-settled that municipalities 
could not be subject to punitive damages.  The United States 
Supreme Court and the majority of states that have considered 
this issue have kept this common-law rule.  See, e.g., Newport v. 
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)(recognizing the common 
law, and extending it to exempt municipalities from punitive 
damages under 42 U.S.C.  1983); Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991)(holding that civil RICO claim, 
because of the punitive nature of its damages, could not be 
brought against a municipality); Fisher v. Miami, 160 So.2d 57 
(Fla.App. 1964)(ruling that punitive damages against a 
municipality do not serve the purpose of punitive damages against 
private bodies, and unfairly punish the public). 
         In fact, originally municipalities were not liable even 
for compensatory damages.  Rather, municipalities, as agents 
solely of the public, were absolutely immune from suit.  See, 
Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng.Rep. 359 (1789).  Since that 
time, absolute immunity for municipalities has been abrogated.  
Judges have held that losses due to tortious conduct on the part 
of municipal employees is better borne by the municipality than 
by the wholly innocent injured individual.  This makes sense, as 
it would be unjust for a plaintiff to go completely uncompensated 
after suffering compensable injuries.  Compensatory damages, 
then, have become part of the cost of the administration of 
government. 
         Such concerns, however, are not present in the realm of 
punitive damages.  Punitive damages are completely unrelated to 
compensating and "making whole" the injured plaintiff.  Rather, 
they are monies awarded solely to punish the defendant, whose 
conduct has been deemed egregious, and to discourage him or her 
from continuing the pattern of behavior.  Punitive damages, when 
assessed against individuals, as they are here against Owens, 
benefit the public by discouraging such behavior.  See, Newport, 
453 U.S. at 261. 
         This rationale, however, is inapplicable to a 
municipality.  Punitive damages, when assessed against a 
municipality, are ultimately borne by the taxpayers, who have no 
control or input in the officer's offensive behavior.  Thus, the 
damages punish those persons who normally benefit by their 
assessment.  Punishing innocent taxpayers serves no purpose but 
to give a windfall to the plaintiff.  For this reason, the 
majority of states that have considered the issue have not 
assessed punitive damages against municipalities. 
         In general, courts viewed punitive damages as contrary 
         to sound public policy because such awards would burden 
         the very taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the 
         wrongdoer was being chastised.  The courts readily 
         distinguished between liability to compensate for 
         injuries inflicted by a municipality's officers and 
         agents, and vindictive damages appropriate as 
         punishment for the bad-faith conduct of those same 
         officers and agents.  Compensation was an obligation 
         properly shared by the municipality itself, whereas 
         punishment properly applied only to the actual 
         wrongdoers.  The courts thus protected the public from 
         unjust punishment and the municipalities from undue 
         fiscal constraints. 
Newport, 453 U.S. at 261. 
         When punitive damages are assessed against a private 
corporation, such costs are ultimately borne by the shareholders. 
However, shareholders in private corporations can demand 
accountings, and can divest themselves of their shares if they 
disapprove of the corporation's conduct.  In contrast, citizens 
of a municipal corporation have no way of demanding an 
accounting, and no way of disassociating except to move to 
another jurisdiction, an option that, depending on financial 
ability, the housing market, availability of suitable 
neighborhoods, and such, is dubious at best. 
         Citizens do have the power to vote for some of their 
municipal officers.  However, this power can be exercised only 
periodically, and even then, citizens cannot make every personnel 
decision.  In the present case, for example, Sadie Johnson, the 
Township manager, who was appointed to her position, appointed 
former chief Owens to his position.  It is difficult to see what 
the citizens of Willingboro could have done in the situation 
before us.  "While theoretically [municipal residents] have a 
voice in selecting the agents who shall represent and control the 
municipality, we know that practically it often happens that the 
government is not of their choice, and its management not in 
accordance with their judgment."  Genty, 937 F.2d at 910, citingRanells v. 
City of Cleveland, 321 N.E.2d 885, 88-89 (Ohio 1975). 
         Moreover, the reasoning that punitive damages serve as 
a deterrent becomes less sensible when applied to a municipality.  
As the Court stated, "it is far from clear that municipal 
officials...would be deterred from wrongdoing by the knowledge 
that large punitive awards could be assessed based on the wealth 
of their municipality."  Newport, 453 U.S. at 268.  Indeed, the 
individual officials are much more likely to be deterred by the 
threat of punitive damages assessed specifically against them. 
         I do not mean to imply by this dissent, that states may 
not ignore these policies and choose to subject their 
municipalities to punitive damages.  However, the state 
legislature must make such a choice explicitly in order to be 
enforceable.  In Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., supra, the Court 
refused to impose punitive damages on municipalities under 42 
U.S.C.  1983.  A substantial portion of its reasoning was that 
the Court found "no evidence that Congress intended to disturb 
the settled common-law immunity."  Id., at 265.  Thus, we too 
should find positive evidence in LAD that the New Jersey 
legislature intended to include municipalities as defendants 
subject to punitive damages.  The absence of an intent to exclude 
them is insufficient to predicate the prediction announced by the 
majority in this appeal. 
         I also doubt that the Legislature, when enacting LAD, 
"thought that it was overcoming the ban of the Tort Claims Act 
(TCA), N.J.S.A.  59:9-2, on awarding punitive damages against 
public entities.  That statute provides: `No punitive or 
exemplary damages shall be awarded against a public entity.' Id." 
Abbamont v. Piscataway Township, 650 A.2d 958, 972 (N.J. 
1994)(Pollock, J., concurring and dissenting). 
                               II. 
         In sum, the better policy, and the weight of the law, 
is against permitting courts to assess punitive damages against a 
municipality, especially at this time when states, including New 
Jersey, the local municipalities, and even the national 
government have troublesome budgetary problems.  Although 
municipalities are liable for the actual damages suffered by 
plaintiffs, and the personal offender for both actual and 
punitive damages, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have 
held that municipal liability is limited to compensatory damages.  
See 18 McQuillin on Municipal Corp.  53.18.10 (3d Ed. 1993).   
         New Jersey is certainly free to set contrary policy in 
its municipalities.  However, such policy should be expressly 
stated by legislative enactment, not judicial decision.  There is 
no express intent in the LAD to subject municipalities to 
punitive damages.  Rather, the statute awards plaintiffs all the 
benefits they would receive at common law.  At common law, a 
plaintiff could have recovered nothing from a municipality.  The 
New Jersey legislature has expressly broadened the definition of 
employer to include municipalities, thus broadening a plaintiff's 
common law remedies.  But without express authorization in the 
statute for also assessing punitive damages against 
municipalities, I am unwilling to agree with the majority that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court would agree that this was the 
legislature's intent.  Such a break with precedent would have to 
be precisely spelled out.  Therefore, I must dissent. 
